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Abstract 
This article will discuss Roma social political integration in the context of rapid political transformation after the collapse of 
Soviet Union in the Eastern and Central Europe. The reasons of failed Roma political mobilization will be discussed referring the 
concept “framing” (R. D. Benford, D.A.Snow, 2000). Both internal and external frame constructions will be discussed in detail in 
order to understand the underlying factors that had influenced the failure of Roma political mobilization, paying special attention 
to education as an example of failed official political discourse. 
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Introduction 
Roma today constitute the largest (about 10 million) and most marginalized ethnic minority of the 
European Union, settled mostly in Central and Eastern Europe. Although they have lived in the region for 
more than 500 years, the Roma’s history in Europe for most of the time has been characterized by 
alienation, persecution and exclusion of political, social, economical aspects of mainstream life.  
However, after the fall of the Soviet Union the “age of opportunities and possibilities” of genuine 
improvement in the condition of the Roma emerged. The rapid pace of political change brought an 
increase in attention and ongoing expansion in the Roma-related activities of European institutions 
starting with an open concern with potentially destabilizing effects of westward Roma migration to 
evolved Maastricht requirement for candidate countries on discrimination and positive minority rights. 
The regime change also afforded the Roma the opportunity to alleviate their political marginality and 
freely organize themselves, as the post-communist states no longer restrained Roma political 
mobilization.  
Yet, during the last couple decades the experience of Roma people presents a paradox. Despite almost 
universally perceived progressive development of Roma issues, there is little actual change in the living 
conditions and life chances of most Roma people in the post-communist states of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Apparently, the arrival of Roma issues on political stage did not mark parallel enlightenment of 
Roma political mobilization, what is considered to hold the most promise of effecting change in their 
conditions. Consequently, these questions arise: why in the “age of opportunities” Roma failed to 
empower themselves “from bellow”? Why European and nation state policies towards Roma turned to be 
not that effective and even discouraging political Roma mobilization? What are the future political 
mobilization and representation perspectives for Roma as one of the largest European minority group? 
Though it is popular to blame the absence of a strong ethnic identity as one of the key reasons for failed 
Roma political mobilization, this article will argue, that it has rather been hindered by organizational 
disputes between movement elites about how to conceptualize, promote and organize around Roma 
identity. Furthermore, official political discourses still perceive Roma identity and Roma culture as 
integral part of Roma problem, what to some extend prohibits the creation of Roma political mobilization. 
These two factors combined together conclude in an ongoing decline of Roma conditions and failure 
of Roma political mobilization. 
The first part of the article will discuss the reasons of failed Roma political mobilization and refer to 
the concept of ‘framing’ used by social movement organizers in their attempts to construct and promote a 
particular understanding and interpretation of social reality as a guide for collective action (R. D. 
Benford, D.A.Snow, 2000). The idea that ethnic identity ‘frames’ is shaped not only by internal group 
strategic identity frame constructions, but also by external institutional context and formulations of 
minority policies will be discussed in detail in the second part of the article. 
Roma political mobilization 
Ethnic political activity tends to increase during political upheavals due to created favorable 
institutional and political circumstances for political activism (Z.Barang, 2002). After the changes of 
1989 unprecedented opportunities for political organization opened the door for all marginal groups in 
Eastern and Central Europe, including Roma. The large number of Roma organizations have been formed 
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during this period, however the quantitative expansion does not reflect a qualitative growth. The majority 
of organizations remain ineffective due to little response from Roma constituencies; the other 
organizations fade in oblivion shortly after creation. The low Roma political efficacy rates surprise, 
because they unlike other minorities, receive great financial and organizational assistance from European 
Union, The Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
Western NGO’s. Moreover, increased political attention on Roma rights brought intense political pressure 
to Central and Eastern European states to improve their treatment of Roma minorities and stimulate their 
political activism. The most common explanations found in academic literature name low ethnic 
awareness, high diversity of Roma communities, and absence of origin state, common language, religion 
and culture as the main obstacles of ethnic Roma political mobilization (Z.Barany, 2001). Zoltan Barany 
(2001) states, that a strong and widely shared sense of ethnic identity is one of the essential components 
of successful ethnic political mobilization defined as a populace of “those who conceive themselves as 
being alike by virtue of their common ancestry <..> or who are so regarded by others” (Z.Barany, 2002-
P310). In contrary to his statement, it could be stated that homogeneous ethnic identity does not, by 
definition, guarantee successful political mobilization around this identity. It must be a well-developed or 
‘empowered’ identity in order to attract and guide constituencies into collective action. Roma failed 
political mobilization due to chosen different weak ‘identity frames’ for mobilization, which simply did 
not resonate with the ‘needs’ of potential constituencies. For the second reason, Roma identity receives 
continuing negative valuations in the official political discourse, what consequently creates additional 
obstacles in political activists attempts of turning ‘stigmatized identity’ into ‘mobilizing identity’. Great 
part of Roma minority is reluctant to officially admit their ethnic belonging because of this particular 
negative society perception of their identity. 
The concept of framing provides a useful contribution to the study of ethnic minority mobilization 
since it directs attention to cognition and persuasion (P.Vermeersch, 2003). ‘Framing’ in social movement 
literature refers to strategic ‘conceptual structure’ or ‘mental structure’ through which people assign 
meaning to social reality, promote a certain understanding of reality and intentionally choose a frame for 
mobilization (P.Vermeersch, 2003). In other words, ‘frames’ function as an interpretative, interactive 
scheme, which enables individuals to locate, perceive and identify themselves within their life space and 
world at large, that in accordance legitimate and motivate collective action (R.D. Benford & D.A. Snow, 
2000). According to Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) ‘framing’ is not a static process, it is 
being continuously constituted, contested and negotiated during the course of movement activity. 
Accordingly meaning, that the boundaries of ethnic minority identity are dynamic and continuously 
reproduced in the light of changing circumstances. Furthermore, to a certain degree identity ‘framing’ 
process is being shaped by local, regional or state socio-cultural context in which it takes place (R.D. 
Benford & D.A. Snow, 2000). Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) point to political 
opportunity structure, cultural opportunities and limitations as important factors affecting ‘framing’ 
process. According to the ‘framing’ approach, ethnic minority identity is perceived not simply as a 
differentiation from the rest of society in terms of language, tradition and so forth, but rather as the result 
of a process in which such differences are deemed socially and politically meaningful and are acted upon 
(P.Vermeersch, 2003). Identity ‘framing’ process does not aim to ‘invent’ an identity, but rather to give a 
certain identity frame, which would mobilize, solidify and empower ethnic minority. In other words, the 
mobilization process would itself contribute to the formation of the ethnic group’s political identity. By 
employing ‘framing’ approach the identity frames adopted in Roma activist discourse will be discussed. 
Roma as a non-territorial nation frame 
In 1977 International Roma Union (IRU) was founded after the first London World Roma Congress. 
IRU is a non-governmental organization that has aimed to become a dominant forum for international 
Roma community activism. In over thirty years its attempts to attract larger international Roma audience 
were unsuccessful; it has rather operated as the forum of a few dozen international elite driven 
organizations (consisting of Roma and non Roma) sustained by patronage of established political interests 
(M. Kovats, 2002). However in 2000 attempts to revive IRU through a new mobilizing ‘frame’ were held 
in World Roma Congress in Prague. The initiatives have been expressed in the international Roma 
Union’s Declaration of a Nation, which conceptualized Roma as a ‘nation’ claiming that all Roma 
constitute a single and distinct political community, which requires its own, separate political 
representation, without the will to become a State (T. Acton, I. Klimova, 2001). The IRU defines Roma as 
a non-territorial trans-national ethnic group and argues that all Roma communities are deeply 
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interconnected through common history, origin, language, culture and therefore Roma should be granted 
a special legal position in Europe. For these proponents the nation ‘frame’ presented a useful tool for 
activism towards international organizations, which were particularly interested in unified international 
Roma actor as a negotiating partner. On an international level, the Roma nation ‘frame’ was received 
effectively, however, it has had little actual impact in creating greater domestic Roma mobilization. 
Though, one could argue that fundamentally all Roma share the same origins, culture and common 
persecution experience in Europe, the problem is that Roma do not identify themselves as a cohesive 
ethnic group. Even within single countries Roma are diffused and diverse: “from the gypsy point of view 
there is no such group as the gypsies” (M. Kovats, 2002-P.4).  At least for now Roma do not share an 
‘imagined community’ or a feeling of belonging to a unified nation. The frame emphasis on common 
origin and transnational community proved to be too weak a tool for bolstering mass mobilization. The 
‘heights-reaching’ transnational proposals did not match up with local and real needs of Roma 
communities. Therefore it is not surprising that ordinary, poorly educated members of Roma community 
that presently live under harsh economical conditions were not attracted to the intentions of Roma 
“nationalists”. 
Further on, Martin Kovats (2002) argues that the promotion of Roma nationalism has been the logical 
extension of the right-wing agenda to segregate Roma people. Framing Roma mobilization on the 
grounds of Common Roma identity, which traditionally has been used to marginalize the status of these 
communities, is legitimating the ideology of segregation. Moreover, Roma nationalist frame does not 
represent Roma grassroots politics, but instead promotes: “authoritarian nationalist tradition in which a 
political community is constructed through the manipulation of vulnerable people, to secure the interests 
of an unaccountable elite.” (M. Kovats, 2002-P4). Since there is a great gap between miniscule Roma 
intelligentsia and the rest of the diverse community there is little chance that Roma nationalism would be 
sustained with democratic control by Roma people as a whole. 
Also importantly, Roma nation frame has been criticized for promoting primarily the interests of 
individual states that are eager to free their governments from Roma issues and costly responsibilities; 
and overall it has been argued that it undermines the Roma position as a national minority in the domestic 
context (P.Vermeersch, 2003). 
Roma as a social class identity frame 
In contrast to the above-discussed national frame based on ‘imagined’ unified Roma community, 
strategic social class identity frame proponents aim to avoid close association with Roma identity. They 
argue that national minority status does not help Roma to diminish popular public stereotypes or 
fundamentally change the social situation of Roma - the emphasis on publicly ‘stigmatized’ identity 
turned to be not beneficial. Instead, they attempt to mobilize Roma on the grounds of social security 
issues emphasizing their poor, disadvantaged conditions (P.Vermeersch, 2003). In this strategic frame, 
Roma identity is conceptualized as representative of the lowest class in economic and social hierarchy 
structure. The focus is laid on urgent educational, housing and employment needs. Therefore, belonging 
to the ethnic community is seen as less important and is considered as a purely individual choice.  
The origins of this identity frame can be traced back to the Soviet times. The Communist period was 
characterized of increased Roma proletarianisation, where they were treated as a social group. All aspects 
of their culture, without exception, were regarded negatively as the obstacles to Roma successful 
integration into society. The rationale of this particular strategy was to increase Roma social integration 
by simultaneously exercising the destruction of their ethnic identity. Though Roma received some sort of 
legitimacy within socialist state, the official policies were targeting harsh assimilation of the group 
(W.Guy, 2001). This less attractive side of social group identity frame, adopted during the Communist 
period reinforced negative Roma perception in present attempts of reviving this concept of identity. Its 
advocates also hoped to strengthen the Roma movement by creating solidarity links with other socially 
excluded non-Roma movements on the basis of general economic support for poor communities, however 
attempts were not successful. Defining Roma primarily as a social group and moving away from focusing 
on ‘stigmatized’ Roma ethnic identity could have been a good strategic frame for political Roma 
mobilization, because up to now many Roma are primarily concerned with their worsening 
socioeconomic conditions. The failure of this strategic frame to attract wider support leads to the 
conclusion that as much as political activists lack effective organizational powers, ordinary Roma lack 
simple political awareness and motivation to act. It is clear, that establishment of a degree of grassroots 
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political awareness among Roma people is very much needed in order to mobilize them on the basis of 
conceptualized political identity. 
Grassroots Roma politics is very weak and immature and so is easily manipulated by the top down 
established interests. An unprecedented growth of Roma organizations does not signify growth in the 
power of Roma people, but the growth of availability of resources provided by EU and the member states 
through non-governmental organization system. A top-down Roma representation is being built on 
‘artificial’ strategic identity frames that don’t reflect the actual needs and demands of Roma people, but 
instead provide a useful tool for public institutions to communicate their interests and political agenda to 
Roma people. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of them to keep Roma organizations politically impotent, 
having no actual political force in compelling authorities to take any particular course of action. 
Therefore, we end up with a situation where top-down attempts of creating Roma political mobilization 
proceed at the price of the development of a democratic Roma politics. And democracy is a pre-condition 
in effective political mobilization. Only if people feel that they are a part of the process and if they feel 
that political engagement will conclude in tangible outcomes, will they maintain solidarity within the 
movement and take responsibility rather than remain politically apathetic. This is the core of successful 
framing strategy in mass political mobilization.  
Conclusively then, framing approach is necessary yet inadequate in attempts to mobilize Roma 
politically. Framing if used together with grassroots initiative creates the possibility to transcend 
shortcomings of Roma highly diverse ethnic identity. In order to enable political mobilization there is a 
necessity for not only a well and strategically developed political identity, but also for a degree of 
political awareness among ordinary Roma people. Not to forget, if framing itself is approached as a 
process of identity discovery at a grass roots level, ordinary Roma people become politically engaged, 
creating a feedback loop of growth in political awareness and mobility. As presented examples show 
these important pre-conditions that could create sufficient basis for Roma political action at the present 
moment are absent. 
It should be taken into account, that political Roma mobilization does not occur in vacuum and is 
largely dependent on external institutional environment and created political opportunities. It is vitally 
important to attract grass roots Roma support, but equally important is to receive political support from 
wider society. The historical opportunity to overcome Roma inequality and past prejudices will fade in 
vain if there will be no political cohesion between Roma and non-Roma citizens. Extensive and durable 
external support from non-Roma on the grounds of shared awareness of common good and interests is 
needed in order to turn Grassroots Roma politics into progressive political phenomenon. However, 
official political discourse continues the promotion of Roma people, their politics and conditions as 
essentially different from those of the rest of society. Official policy framing Roma as “substantially 
different” reinforces their negative images in media and public opinion. Consequently it hinders the 
prospects of Roma political mobilization. 
Official political discourse towards Roma 
The official political attention towards Roma issues started to gain ground after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Primarily it was a pure security concern from European Unions side to prevent mass Roma 
migration westwards – “to keep the Roma where they are”. In tact with European integration EU rhetoric 
added an emphasis on discrimination and positive minority rights, which became one of obligatory 
criteria of EU accession. However it’s been clear that EU primal concern remained prevention of Roma 
migration (R.Gugilielmo, T.W.Waters, 2005). This concern is clearly expressed in the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) 1993 report. Discrimination and violence problems 
against Roma were presented in the context of Committee’s implicit concern: “<…> reduction in 
pressures of international migration.” (R.Gugilielmo, T.W.Waters, 2005-P.768). The underlying message 
was clear - to prevent mass invasion of ‘unwelcome economic burden’. In 2000 HCNM report rhetoric 
emphasis has been moved on minority rights protection (R.Gugilielmo, T.W.Waters, 2005). Yet, to 
extend that Roma continued migration or were thought in doing that, they were still regarded as a 
‘problem’. It’s not surprising that recent Romanian and Bulgarian Roma migration to Finland and Italy 
(Naples) were welcomed by highly negative society reaction reinforced by officially promoted fear of 
uncontrolled ‘Roma invasion’. 
Overall EU official policy towards Roma has been characterized as reflecting more the interests of 
mainstream institutions than those of Roma people and communities. EU policies lacked sensitivity and 
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clarity in vision for Roma social integration and their political empowerment. The financial support 
served to ‘assist’ rather than ‘solve’ long-term Roma problems. 
In accordance with EU negotiation requirements on minority rights East and Central EU candidate 
states started to pay more attention to Roma issues. It has been criticized that official state policies have 
not been driven by real concern for the position of Roma, but rather for the bare will to fulfill the 
accession requirements. The implementation of required regulations and declarations however did not 
mean their effective enforcement. Moreover, for example official Czech state policy in resolutions 
towards Roma issues unintentionally stimulated negative views on Roma identity. The resolutions of 
1999 and 2000 named negative aspects of Roma identity as the core element of the policy problem that 
these resolutions were to address. Roma integration was defined as: “ Romani community’s full-scale 
incorporation into society while preserving most of the cultural specificities and different features <…> 
so long as these distinctive features are not in variance with the laws of Czech Republic.” 
(P.Vermeerschr, 2003-P.893). This definition indicates that some features of Roma identity are linked 
with condemnable social behavior. Slovak Republic 1999 resolution on Roma vaguely suggested that 
Roma lifestyle and culture are problematic by stating that: “Some aspects of life of a certain part of this 
minority cause social distance in majority society”, or that problems are caused by the specific way of life 
of a part of the Romani national minority”(P.Vermeerschr, 2003-P.896). The presented examples suggest 
that official these state political discourse still perceive Roma identity and Roma culture as integral part 
of Roma problem. The official identification of social behavior with ethnic Roma identity can easily 
resonate with public discourse and can lead to support a discourse of “otherness” treating Roma as 
“substantially different”. It is not surprising that it becomes difficult for Roma political activists to 
promote alternative understanding of themselves and engage Roma in political mobilization. Many Roma 
fear that official identification with Roma ethnic identity may allow others to discredit them even more.   
Education - an example of failed official political discourse 
Education has often been referred to as a main source of Roma social inclusion, political awareness 
building and mobilization also as a key factor for Roma to access labor market. In EU adopted platform 
for Roma inclusion in 2011 education is addressed as one of the four main areas for improving social and 
economic integration for Roma. However despite all the official attention and funds devoted there is a 
little change in this area. In most Central and Eastern European countries only about 20 %. of Roma 
children ever enroll in primary school.  And those that do enroll are likely to drop out before the end of 
basic schooling and less than 1 % of Roma attends the University (http://www.unicef.org). According to a 
survey by the Open Society Institute in six EU countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania 
and Slovakia) only 42% of Roma children complete primary school, compared to an average of 97.5% for 
the general population across the EU as a whole (http://europa.eu). UNICEF report “On the rights of 
Roma children to education” provides several explanations of poor education outcomes.  The lack of 
quality in early childhood education services contributes to a lack for readiness to school. Mainstream 
institutions are conventionally insensitive to the cultural and linguistic background of Roma communities. 
Most often Roma rights and needs are overlooked because Central and Eastern European countries are 
still coping with social and economic transition issues. Nonetheless the fact that most of Roma children 
parents received inadequate education makes them less empowered to claim education for their children. 
Poverty and social exclusion also create barriers to access education. The inflexibility of school systems 
to address these issues only accelerates Roma children exclusion. Segregation of Roma Children between 
schools, within schools and into special school prevails. On one hand most regular schools are not 
prepared to integrate children with special needs, but there is also lack of willingness among Roma 
parents to enroll their children in regular schools. Most of them prefer the opportunity for their children to 
study in segregated schools with their Roma peers. Other issues as lack of teaching quality and methods, 
language barrier, prejudice and hostility also contribute to unsuccessful Roma engagement in education.  
Although in 2005 declaration of the Decade of Roma inclusion was signed by as many as 12 countries 
and brought together on the political level different intergovernmental and non- governmental 
organizations as well as Roma civil society, the aims and commitments regarding Roma education tend to 
be poorly implemented. Governments across the region overwhelmingly fail to prioritize and consider the 
specific needs of Roma for inclusion into the educational system, and appropriate platforms and 
mechanisms for Roma communities to voice their concerns and influence decisions are still largely 
missing (UNICEF, 2011). The problem is that most governments think of Roma inclusion in terms of 
sporadic actions but not in terms of integrated policies that would address systematic issues. There is a 
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lack of political will to set agendas and push for the implementation of policies. Regular monitoring of 
national state policy implementation is also poor. Critics point out that Roma integration decade excluded 
Roma: “Local Roma communities are not aware of the decade efforts and often do not feel the results on 
the ground. Many believe that the Decade Action Plans are mainly focused to reach already involved and 
already aware citizens.”(http://www.eurasiareview.com). 
The 2011 EU Platform for Roma inclusion also ambitiously aims to help member states not only 
prepare national strategies for Roma integration under EU framework process but also to ensure member 
state monitoring on the achievement of Roma integration goals. However criticism continues on EU aims 
being too vague. Also it remains unclear how EU and national authorities will integrate Roma people and 
ensure effective monitoring of national states. Success can only be achieved if governments work on 
changing their institutions and if Roma become full participants in the system.   
When seeking to improve Roma inclusion in education, it is essential that the actions at the local level 
be aligned with appropriate national and EU policies. It is also essential to ensure adequate institutional 
and financial means so that national policies can actually be implemented.  
As we have seen up to now national and EU strategies for Roma inclusion were too vague and often 
lack consistency. This does not necessarily mean that official policy makers have intentionally aimed to 
fail the inclusion. However it does reveal the inadequacies and gaps in official political discourse towards 
Roma and most importantly failure to include Roma community in policy decision-making. 
Conclusions 
Widely accepted suggestions that Roma political mobilization failed mainly due to absence of clearly 
defined culture, language, religion and homogeneous identity. By adopting identity framing approach, it 
could be stated that a well-developed identity frame which enables individuals to identify, locate and 
construct a particular understanding of social reality, motivates them in collective action. Arguing that 
framing approach is necessary, yet, inadequate in attempts to mobilize Roma politically, if not used 
together with grassroots initiatives. Only if people feel that they are a part of the political process and if 
they feel that political engagement will conclude in tangible outcomes, will Roma political mobilization 
be successful and transcend the shortcomings of highly diverse ethnic identity. However up to date 
political Roma mobilization has been preceded at the price of democratic Roma politics. The increased 
number of Roma organizations does not represent the growth in power of Roma people, but rather the 
growth in availability of external resources. The present Roma political representation is built on top-
down, ‘artificial’ strategic identity frames which barely resonate with ordinary Roma needs and demands. 
Moreover, external environment for Roma political mobilization was not particularly encouraging. 
Beyond widely escalated Roma issue importance, Roma are still perceived in official political discourse 
as ‘problematic’ within their culture and identity.  Discussed example of failed Roma inclusion in 
education confirms official political discourse towards Roma being mainly “top down” political strategy, 
lacking clear aims and implementation control tools. Roma participation here is essential in order to 
improve communication channels, commitment and motivation between different project stakeholders. 
Unless Roma become a force that counts in the democratic power game, Roma’s achievements in 
influencing policy making will be very limited. Providing a voice and visibility to the minority’s elite is 
therefore essential, both because this elite is still small and requires support to be heard and because 
successful participation can stimulate Roma interest in getting involved in public life. 
Roma circumstances won’t change unless there will be no political cohesion between Roma and non-
Roma citizens. Extensive external support from non-Roma on the grounds of shared awareness of 
common good and interests is needed in order to turn grassroots Roma mobilization into progressive 
political phenomenon. 
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ROMŲ POLITINIO ATSTOVAVIMO PROBLEMOS. ŠVIETIMAS – KAIP ŽLUGUSIO OFICIALAUS 
POLITINIO DISKURSO PAVYZDYS 
 
S a n t r a u k a  
Romai sudaro didžiausią (apie 10 milijonų) ir labiausiai marginalizuotą etninę mažumų grupę Europos 
sąjungoje. Šiame straipsnyje bus aptariama Romų sociopolitinė integracija politinės transformacijos kontekste, kuri 
įvyko žlugus Sovietų Sąjungai Rytų ir Vidurio Europoje. Bus aptariamas Romų politinės mobilizacijos žlugimo 
priežastys, pasitelkiant „įrėminimo“ koncepciją (R. D. Benford, D.A.Snow, 2000). Vidiniai ir išoriniai “įrėminimo” 
koncepcijos konstruktai bus aptariami detaliai, kad, kad atskleistų ir padėtų suprasti gilumines priežastis, kurios 
nulėmė Romų politinės mobilizacijos nesėkmę. Specialus dėmesys bus skiriamas edukacijai, kaip žlugusio politinio 
diskurso pavyzdžiui atskleisti.     
 
 
